[GRASS5] Objections to release 5.0.0stable?

[Bernhard Reiter]

On Thu, Aug 08, 2002 at 11:50:32PM -0700, Eric G. Miller wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2002 at 07:00:40AM +0100, Glynn Clements wrote:
> > > But, I personally would be very cautious about using GRASS in
> > > a setting where security concerns are high.  I guarantee some
> > > tricky hacker could find a way to create a buffer overflow if
> > > given a chance...
> > 
> > Well, GRASS doesn't include any setuid programs, it doesn't provide
> > any network services, and the /tmp/grass-<user> directory which
> > contains the monitor sockets should be mode 700.
> > 
> > However, I wouldn't recommend running any GRASS module on
> > untrustworthy data, including accessing a world-writable database
> > (GISDBASE) directory on a system which has untrusted users.

> > GRASS isn't secure. Actually, it's the opposite of secure. You
> > wouldn't need to bother with a buffer overflow; exploiting one of the
> > many unsafe calls to system() would be easier.
> 
> Yea, I was mostly thinking of the scenario where GRASS might be run with
> elevated priveledges.  

Maybe we should add a statement to the readmes explaining that
GRASS should not be run with priviledges.
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