[PostGIS] #5567: Mark PostGIS extensions as trusted ( PG13+ )

[PostGIS]

#5567: Mark PostGIS extensions as trusted ( PG13+ )
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  Reporter:  strk         |      Owner:  strk
      Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  closed
  Priority:  medium       |  Milestone:  PostGIS 3.5.0
 Component:  postgis      |    Version:  master
Resolution:  wontfix      |   Keywords:
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Changes (by robe):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix

Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 rouault]:
 > https://www.postgresql.org/docs/13/extend-extensions.html mentions
 "Generally, this should not be set true for extensions that could allow
 access to otherwise-superuser-only abilities, such as file system access."
 So obviously you don't want postgis_raster to be trusted (at least when
 out_db support is enabled). But even regular postgis can access files like
 using ST_Transform() with a PROJ.4 string using +nadgrids=/some/path .
 ST_TransformPipeline() can also use various PROJ operations that load
 grids or JSON files.

 Thanks for the input.  Yah given all that I think we should definitely
 stay untrusted.  If a sysadmin really wants to mark our extensions
 trusted, they can do so by changing the extension file.
-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.osgeo.org/postgis/ticket/5567#comment:7>
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